Estimating a New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve

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Abstract

This paper estimates a New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve for South Africa to investigate the responsiveness of nominal wages to labour market conditions. The estimation is based on a model with staggered nominal wages setting, where all variations in hired labour input is taking place at the extensive margin. First we estimate the model using aggregate data from 1971 to 2013. Aggregate estimation results show that private sector nominal wages are not very responsive to employment conditions, while they also reveal a certain sensitivity to inflation and quite a good correlation with inflation expectations. On the other hand, the relationship between nominal wage inflation and price inflation is quite strong and robust for the whole sample. However, it becomes quantitatively weak for the inflation targeting period. In that period, trade unions inflation expectations are instead strongly correlated with nominal wage inflation.

In the second part of the paper we assess the response of nominal wages to employment, labour productivity and output prices, given the reservation wage, using a panel of nine industrial sectors over the period 1970-2013. The findings confirm that nominal wage inflation has consistently outpaced the growth in productivity, even after correcting for price inflation, and that employment conditions had little effect on wage dynamics. We also test for the possibility that the dynamic of wages is anchored by an underlined reservation wage to investigate the presence of an error correction term in the wage equation for South Africa.

The overall picture that comes out from the analysis is that of a wage formation mechanism that is very insensitive to overall macroeconomic conditions.

Keywords: Wage rigidities, unemployment, labour market, Phillips Curve, New Keynesian.

JEL Codes: E2, E24, E26, E31, E12

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1 Introduction

The negative relation between the rate of change of wages and the unemployment rate has been central to our intuition about the functioning of the economy at least from the seminal article of William Phillips on "The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957" (Phillips, 1958). Although most of the subsequent work concentrated on the relationship between price inflation and unemployment in a Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) setting, relatively recent New-Keynesian literature (for example Gordon 1997, Staiger et al, 1997, Erceg et al, 2000, Gali, 2010, Blanchard and Gali, 2010) has refocused our attention on the nominal wage-unemployment relationship and has shown that monetary policy efficiency depends critically on the responsiveness of wages and prices to changes in aggregate demand. A change in nominal wages affects employment because of its effect on firm marginal cost and, given the monopolistic competitive market structure, on price inflation. The inflationary effect of wage increases induces a contractionary monetary response, which causes a reduction of employment. The cost of adjustment will be higher the less sensitive is wage dynamics to demand conditions. Consequently if wages are very responsive to employment conditions, monetary policy can reduce inflationary pressures on the economy by a relatively small contraction in demand. However, if wages do not respond strongly to demand conditions, the potential sacrifice ratio of a contractionary monetary policy can be very significant.

Given these premises, this paper, for the first part, revisits the original findings of Phillips (1958) for the South African economy following the staggered nominal wage setting model introduced by Erceg et al (2000). The staggered nominal wage follows Calvo (1983) formalism to derive what Gali (2011) refers to as the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve. The second part of this paper investigates wage rigidities at a sectoral level using data from nine industries, and by also accounting for labour productivity growth and the reservation wage. The overall findings suggest that wages in the economy do not respond strongly to demand conditions, therefore indicating large wage rigidities, low elasticity of substitution and large wage mark-ups. We also find the presence of an error correction term in the South African wage equation, which is an indication that factors including considerable bargaining power unions, rigorous market regulations and a sizeable informal sector have an important impact on wage dynamics.

Wage Phillips Curve for the US economy. The South African labour market on the other hand presents features that are unusual by international standards. High and persistent unemployment rates do not prevent the real cost of labour from rising (Fedderke, 2012). This is evidence of strong rigidities that originate from both demand and supply sides of labour.

On the supply side, market segmentation, high reservation wages and the mismatch of skills mainly contribute to the failure of markets to clear. Kingdon and Knight (2004, 2006a, b) argue that the labour market in South Africa is segmented between formal and informal sectors with wages sticky in the former. Moll (1993) and Hofmeyr (2000) identify a segmentation between unionised and non-unionised labour market where wage rigidities are present in the former given the level of bargaining power of unions. Casale and Posel (2002, 2003) and Heintz and Posel (2008) structure the labour market between unionised formal, non-unionised formal and informal segments. Bertrand et al (2003), Dinkelman (2004) and Klase and Woolard (2005) argue that the reservation wage in South Africa is high which significantly impedes labour market participation. This is further emphasised by the issue of skills mismatched. The education system has failed to provide the labour market with enough skilled workers which undermines the process of firms moving toward greater skills intensity in terms of their employment structure (Bhorat and Hodge, 1999, Banerjee et al 2008, and Rodrik, 2008). An important implication for this is that because the participants in the labour market are unable to send the right signals, labour is often mispriced (Fedderke, 2012). This combined with a low productivity shows that the cost of labour in South Africa is too high (Schussler, 2012, Nattrass and Seekings, 2013), which is the main issue of labour rigidities emanating from the demand side.

The Phillips curve has been consistently investigated in the South African literature as presented in Burger and Markinkov (2006). However, most of these studies focus on the relationship between inflation and the output gap - or in some cases, the deviation of unemployment from its natural rate. This paper revisits the original relationship between (un)employment and wage inflation, given strong labour market rigidities combined with the weak correlation between labour productivity and wage growth rates. We structure the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 explores the historical development of the Phillips Curve literature in South Africa while section 3 derives the model following Gali (2011). Section 4 gives a glance at the data first and then comments on the empirical results. Section 5 is a sectoral analysis of the responsiveness of nominal wage to output price, labour productivity and employment given the reservation wage. Section 6 concludes.

2 The Phillips curve in the South African literature

This section presents an overview of historical developments regarding the Phillips curve in South Africa. As reported by du Plessis and Burger (2006), evidence of early contributions stretch all the way back to the 1970s and include works of Hume (1971), Strydom and Steenkamp (1976), Strebel (1976),
etc. These studies have in common the fact that they all followed closely the framework of Phillips (1958) in investigating the trade-off between nominal wages and unemployment. As the authors highlight, the main drawback about the application of this framework for South Africa was the inaccuracy of the measure of unemployment, which promptly led authors to move away from unemployment to rather focus on output gap. In doing so, Truu (1975) and Strydom and Steenkamp (1976) find a significant trade-off between output gap and inflation but only when the sample is restricted to the 1960s.

This consequently raised the question of the presence of the Phillips Curve in South Africa. More importantly, if this presence is then justified, the form that it takes was another relevant interrogation. One thing certain about the South African literature regarding the Phillips curve is mainly how to reconcile theory and empirical realizations. Du Plessis and Burger (2006) emphasize that this ambiguity has divided researchers on the topic into two factions. A first group of authors (Strebel, 1976, Nell, 2000, and Burger and Marinkov, 2006) focused on non linear specifications in an attempt to at least replicate and identify in the business cycle periods when the trade-off between inflation and output gap associated with the Phillips curve might have held. On the other hand, a second group adopted a then unorthodox approach by abandoning the hope of including a demand effect in the inflation equation for South Africa, either explicitly (Pretorius and Small, 1994) or rather implicitly (Fedderke and Schaling, 2005).

Although the original Phillips curve estimated in 1958 captures the relationship between wage inflation and unemployment, subsequent studies have directed the focus more toward a relationship between price inflation and unemployment, or between price inflation and output gap as commonly found in the literature. The way to estimate the equation therefore merely involves traditionally regressing the change in the level of prices on a measure of output gap for a first group of researchers, or regressing the change in the price level on the deviation of unemployment from its natural rate, for a second group. Studies from both research factions can be found in the South African literature. For instance, Hodge (2002) belongs to the latter while works similar to the one by Nell (2000) fall into the former category of researchers. Both studies found puzzling results using South African data. Hodge (2002) only finds evidence of a relationship between first differences of inflation and growth, whereas Nell (2000) could only reconcile theory and data during periods of accelerating inflation when the economy overheats. This has therefore led to criticisms of the traditional way of estimating the equation, and early works as Gordon (1990) already argued the traditional approach generates biased results.

Gordon (1997) therefore introduced a triangular model which has the novelty of controlling for inertia effects, output levels, and the rate of change in output effects. He finds relevant results for various European countries, the US and Japan. After exploring how Gordon (1997) departs from the then mainstream literature, Burger and Marinkov (2006) applies the model to South Africa. Furthermore, building on the findings of Nell (2000), the authors split their measure of output gap into two to
accommodate for periods when the economy overheats and for times when economic activities are relatively weak. They find that a triangular approach for the Phillips curve applies in South Africa only to a certain extent. They find evidence of inertia effects but output level and output rate of change effects are clearly absent. Interestingly, when accounting for the unit labour cost, Burger and Marinkov (2006) find a statistically significant parameter in all of their regressions. Therefore, the authors suggest that further research regarding labour market effects on South African inflation should be investigated. This finding in itself, provides a motivation for this paper.

We follow closely the framework of Gali (2011) and use a model that accounts for price inflation, wage inflation and (un)employment. This approach of estimating the Phillips curve by taking into account wage rigidities is particularly interesting given that the South African literature in this subject mainly focuses on price inflation dynamics alone. Very few studies (Gallaway, et al, 1970, Strydom and Steenkamp, 1976, and Levin and Horn, 1987) have focused on the wage inflation in the past. The framework introduced by Gali (2011) is briefly laid off in the next section.

3 The model

3.1 The basic model

This model assume indivisible labour with all the variations in hired input taking place in the form of variations in employment. There is a large representative household with a continuum of members represented by the unit square and indexed by a pair \((i, j) \in [0,1] \times [0,1]\). The first dimension (indexed by \(i \in [0,1]\)) represents the type of labour in which a given household member is specialized. The second dimension on the other hand (indexed by \(j \in [0,1]\)) defines his disutility from work. This disutility is given by \(\chi \varphi\) if he is employed, zero otherwise. \(\varphi \geq 0\) defines the elasticity of the marginal disutility of work and \(\chi_t > 0\) is an exogenous preference shifter which we also refer to as a labour supply shock given the impact it has on labour supply.

Following Merz (1995), Gali (2011) define a utility that is logarithmic in consumption. Further, there is full risk sharing among household members. Therefore, the household period utility corresponds to the integral of its members’ utilities and is given by the following:

\[
U(C_t \{N_t(i)\}, \chi_t) \equiv \log C_t - \chi_t \int_0^1 \int_0^{N_t(i)} j^\varphi \, dj \, di
\]

\[
U(C_t \{N_t(i)\}, \chi_t) \equiv \log C_t - \chi_t \int_0^1 \frac{N_t(i)}{1+\varphi} \, di
\]

where \(C_t\) denotes household consumption and \(N_t(i)\) is the fraction of members specialized on type \(i\) labour who are employed in period \(t\). The household seeks to maximize:

\[
E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t \{N_t(i)\}, \chi_t)
\]
subject to the following budget constraint:

$$P_tC_t + Q_tC_t \leq B_{t-1} + \int_0^1 W_t(i)N_t(i)di + \Pi_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)$$

where $\beta$ is the discount rate, $P_t$ is the price of the consumption bundle, $W_t(i)$ is the nominal wage for labour of type $i$, $B_t$ denotes purchases of a nominally riskless one-period bond at a price $Q_t$, and $\Pi_t$ is a lump sum component of income which may include dividends from ownership of firms.

Wage rigidities are introduced in the model assuming the formalism of Calvo (1983). Therefore, workers supplying a labour service of specific type get to reset their nominal wage with probability $1 - \theta_w$ each period. This probability is independent across labour types. In addition, it is not affected by the time that has gone by since last the wage was reset. Another fraction of workers $\theta_w$ keep their wage unchanged in any given period. $\theta_w$ is therefore defined as the natural index of nominal wage rigidities. Once the wage has been set, the quantity of workers employed is determined unilaterally by firms, with households willingly meeting that demand by sending its specialized workers with the lowest work disutility. It is important to note however that the wage remains above the disutility of work for a marginal worker.

Workers re-optimize their wage in period $t$ choosing a wage $W_t^*$ that maximizes the household utility as opposed to their own individual utility, subject to a sequence of isoelastic demand schedules for their labour type and the usual sequence of household flow of budget constraint. The following first order condition is therefore derived and written as:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta_w)^k E_t \left\{ N_{t+k|t} \left( \frac{W_t^*}{P_t+k} - MRS_{t+k|t} \right) \right\} = 0,$$

where $N_{t+k|t}$ denotes the quantity demanded in period $t + k$ of a labour type whose wage is being reset in period $t$, $MRS_{t+k|t} \equiv \chi_{t+k}C_{t+k}N_{t+k|t}$ is the relevant marginal rate of substitution between consumption and employment in period $t + k$, and finally $MRS_t \equiv \epsilon_w/\epsilon - 1$ is the desired or flexible wage markup, with $\epsilon_w$ denoting the constant wage elasticity of demand for services of each labour type.

After log-linearising the above optimality condition around a zero inflation steady state, and using lower case letters to indicate the log of the corresponding variable, the following approximate wage setting rule is obtained:

$$w_t^* = \mu^w + (1 - \beta \theta_w) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta_w)^k E_t \{ mRS_{t+k|t} + p_{t+k} \}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)$$

where $\mu^w \equiv \log MRS_t$.

In absence of nominal rigidities ($\theta_w = 0$) we have $w_t^* = w_t = \mu^w + mRS_t + p_t$, implying a constant markup $\mu^w$ of the wage $w_t$ over the price-adjusted marginal rate of substitution $mRS_t + p_t$. When nominal rigidities are present on the other hand, new wages are set as a constant markup $\mu^w$ over a weighted average of current and expected future price-adjusted marginal rates of substitution.
Assuming \( mrs_t = \epsilon_t + \varphi n_t + \xi_t \) denote the economy’s average log marginal rate of substitution, where \( \xi_t \equiv \log \chi_t \), therefore:

\[
mrs_{t+k|t} = mrs_{t+k} + \varphi(n_{t+k} - n_{t+k}) = mrs_{t+k} - \epsilon_w \varphi(w^*_t - w_{t+k})
\]

Log-linearising the expression for aggregate wage index around a zero inflation steady state gives:

\[
w_t = \theta w_{t-1} + (1 - \theta)w^*_t
\]

By combining (1) and (4) the baseline wage inflation equation is obtained:

\[
\pi^w_t = \beta E_t \{\pi^w_{t+1} - \lambda_w (\mu^w_t - \mu^w)\}
\]

where \( \pi^w_t \equiv w_t - w_{t-1} \) denotes wage inflation, \( \mu^w_t \equiv w_t - p_t - mrs_t \) is the average wage markup and \( \lambda_w \equiv \frac{(1-\theta_w)(1-\beta \theta_w)}{\theta_w(1+\epsilon_w \varphi)} > 0 \).

Wage inflation therefore depends positively on expected one period ahead wage inflation and negatively on the deviation of the average wage markup from its desired value. By solving (5) forward:

\[
\pi^w_t = -\lambda_w \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^k E_t \{ (\mu^w_{t+k} - \mu^w) \}
\]

which means that wage inflation is proportional to the discounted sum of expected deviations of current and future average wage markups from their desired levels. More intuitively, if average wage markups are below their desired level, workers that have a chance to reset their wage will tend to adjust it upward thus generating positive wage inflation, and vice versa.

In the literature, the estimated version of the above generally allow for automatic indexation to price inflation of the wages that are not re-optimized in any period. However, following Gali (2011) we assume the indexation rule given by:

\[
w_{t+k|t} = w_{t+k-1|t} + \gamma \pi^p_{t+k-1} + (1 - \gamma) \pi^p + g
\]

for \( k = 1, 2, 3..., \) where \( w_{t+k|t} \) denotes the period \( t + k \) log wage for workers who last re-optimized their wage in period \( t \) (with \( w_{t|t} \equiv w^*_t \)), \( \pi^p \) is the measure of price inflation to which wages are indexed, \( \pi^p \) is the steady state price inflation, and \( g \) is the rate of growth of productivity (and real wages) in the steady state. In that case the following wage inflation equation can be derived:

\[
\pi^p_t - \gamma \pi^p_{t-1} = \alpha + \beta E_t \{\pi^w_{t+1} - \gamma \pi^p_t\} - \lambda_w (\mu^w_t - \mu^w)
\]

where \( \alpha \equiv (1 - \beta)((1 - \gamma) \pi^p + g) \).
3.2 Extension of the model

By taking current labour market conditions as given and using household welfare as a criterion, a household member will find it optimal to participate in the labour market in period $t$ if and only if:

$$\frac{W_t(i)}{P_t} \geq \chi_t C_t j^\varphi$$

The real wage prevailing in the worker’s trade must be above his disutility from working (expressed in terms of consumption).

Thus the marginal supplier of type $i$ labour denoted by $L_t(i)$, is implicitly given by:

$$\frac{W_t(i)}{P_t} = \chi_t C_t L_t(i)^\varphi$$

By taking the log and integrating over $i$, we obtain:

$$w_t - p_t = c_t + \varphi l_t + \xi_t$$

where $l_t \equiv \int_0^1 l_t(i) di$ denotes the model’s implied aggregate participation or labour force, $w_t \equiv \int_0^1 w_t(i) di$ is defined as the average wage.

Gali (2011) defines the unemployment rate $u_t$ as follows:

$$u_t \equiv l_t - n_t$$

By combining (9) and (10) with the expression for the average wage markup given by $\mu_t^w \equiv (w_t - p_t) - (c_t + \varphi n_t + \xi_t)$, the following linear relationship between the wage markup and the unemployment rate can be written as:

$$\mu_t^w = \varphi u_t$$

The natural rate of unemployment, $u^n_t$ is defined as the rate of the unemployment that would prevail in the absence of nominal wage rigidities. Therefore assuming a constant desired wage markup, it follows that $u^n_t$ is constant and given by:

$$u^n = \frac{\mu^w}{\varphi}$$

The unemployment is therefore a consequence of worker’s market power (the wage being above their perfectly competitive level). Unemployment fluctuations on the other hand result from the slow adjustment of wages.

Combining (5), (11) and (12) gives the following New Keynesian Phillips Curve:

$$\pi_t^w = \beta E_t \{\pi_{t+1}^w\} - \lambda w \varphi (u_t - u^n)$$
By combining equations (8) and (11) the following augmented New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve implied by Gali (2011) is obtained:

\[
\pi_t^w = \alpha + \gamma \pi_{t-1}^p + \beta E_t \left\{ \pi_{t+1}^w - \gamma \pi_t^w \right\} - \lambda w \varphi (u_t - u^n) \quad (14)
\]

It is important to note that even though equation (13) shows a relationship between wage inflation and the unemployment rate, it differs from the original Phillips curve first uncovered by Phillips (1958). First off, equation (13) is a microfounded structural relationship between wage inflation and unemployment. Therefore, the steepness of the slope of equation (13) is decreasing in wage rigidity to the point that as wages approach full flexibility, the curve becomes vertical. Secondly, equation (13) defines wage inflation as a forward looking variable which is in contrast with the static and contemporaneous nature of the original Phillips curve in which expectations play no role.

Next we turn to define a reduced form representation for the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve which we intend to estimate using South Africa data. By assuming that unemployment follows a stationary AR(2) process, we can formally write:

\[
\hat{u}_t = \phi_1 \hat{u}_{t-1} + \phi_2 \hat{u}_{t-2} + \epsilon_t \quad (15)
\]

where \(\hat{u}_t = u_t - u^n\) and \(\epsilon_t\) is white noise. By combining (15) and (14) the following wage inflation is obtained:

\[
\pi_t^w = \alpha + \gamma \pi_{t-1}^p + \psi_0 \hat{u}_t + \psi_1 \hat{u}_{t-1} \quad (16)
\]

where

\[
\psi_0 \equiv -\frac{\lambda w \varphi}{1 - \beta (\phi_1 + \beta \phi_2)}, \quad \psi_1 \equiv -\frac{\lambda w \varphi \beta \phi_2}{1 - \beta (\phi_1 + \beta \phi_2)}
\]

Equation (16) is therefore estimated in the next section.

4 Empirical results

4.1 Data

Labour market data in South Africa is notoriously not very reliable and subject to extensive change in definition. Our quarterly data covers the period 1970Q1-2013Q4. We use a large set of different variables and different definitions of labour market conditions. The baseline specification includes, Consumer Price Index as a measure of price inflation and two alternative sources of wage data namely the remuneration in the private sector, and unit labour costs in the manufacturing. Wage inflation is
measured as the centered four quarter difference of the log of nominal wage expressed in percentage terms. The same applies for price inflation. The cyclical unemployment, measured as difference from the mean, is really usable only from 2000Q1 to 2014Q1. To have a longer specification we need to substitute the unemployment measure with more reliable employment measures, in particular private sector employment and manufacturing employment. The private sector employment has gone through a series of revision and the data are not always comparable through time. Nevertheless we try statistically to reduce the effect of these distortions. Manufacturing employment is the most reliable measure, but it is only a proxy of the overall labour market conditions. The employment variables are de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter to analyze variable employment as its deviation from the steady state value, while the unemployment series is demeaned of the average value of 23 percent unemployment rate, that implicitly we assume is the natural rate of unemployment. Data sources include the South African Reserve Bank, Quantec and the Saint Louis Federal Reserve Bank database.

Before commenting on the regression analysis, it is worth to have a quick look at the data to be used in estimating specification (16). The basic hypothesis common with the old Phillips curve specification is that there is a negative relationship between wage inflation and unemployment. In Figure 1 we display this relationship between for the period 2000-2014 in two scatter plots of wage inflation and unemployment to check if such a relationship applies in the case of South Africa.

![Figure 1: Private sector wage inflation and unemployment](image)

The relationship appears immediately to be quite weak. This could be due to the specific definition of unemployment used in South Africa. As argued by Banerjee (2008), a lot of the changes in the employment rate observed are counted for by the change in labour participation rate. Thus a positive
relationship between wage inflation and employment rate could be more revealing. Figure 2 shows the relationship between wage inflation and manufacturing employment between 1971 and 2014.

Figure 2: Private sector wage inflation and manufacturing employment

The positive relationship between wage inflation and employment seems much more promising, as is the relationship between wage inflation and total private employment. Less promising is the same relationship once viewed from the inflation targeting period 2000-2014, in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Wage inflation and unemployment 2000-2013
The final relationship in equation (16) is the one between wage inflation and price inflation. Historically the relationship appears very strong, as shown below:

**Figure 4: CPI inflation and private sector wage inflation**

The relationship appears to weaken during the inflation targeting period, which is to be expected if monetary policy tries to insulate the overall price level from a change in the relative price of labour.

**Figure 5: CPI inflation and private sector wage inflation 2000-2013**

On the other hand there seems to be a strong correlation between wage inflation and inflation
expectations of trade unions as recorded by the BER, a fact that gives some indication that controlling inflation expectations might still be the most direct way to control wage dynamics.

Figure 6: One year ahead trade unions inflation expectations and private sector wage inflation

4.2 Estimation results

We report in the tables below OLS estimates of several specifications of the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve, each specification is a restricted version of equation (16). The standard errors are reported in brackets. In Table 1, column (1) and (2) reports the traditional Phillips curve relationship between employment and wage inflation, for the whole sample in column (1) and for the post-Apartheid sub-sample in column (2). In column (3) and (4) we report the results of introducing past inflation in the specification to capture inflation expectations, and finally in column (5) and (6) we report the full specification of equation (16). The relationship between wage inflation and employment is clearly weak and getting weaker in the most recent sample. Nominal wage and inflation have a strong and robust relationship which also is quantitative weaker in the second sample.
Table 1: Estimated wage inflation: private sector wage

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<tr>
<td>$n_t$</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td>$n_{t-1}$</td>
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<td>-0.07</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\pi_{t-1}$</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td>0.25*</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
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*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.

The results are largely confirmed if a different measure of the change in labour cost is considered. In Table 2 we use the nominal unit labour cost inflation as measure of wage, which has the advantage to separate the growth in wages from contemporaneous changes in productivity. The results are actually more robust, and there is a stronger relationship between labour cost and employment conditions, even though this relationship seems to become weaker in the second sample.

Table 2: Estimated wage inflation: unit labour costs

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<td>$n_t$</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
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<td>$n_{t-1}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
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<td>-0.12***</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\pi_{t-1}$</td>
<td>0.74***</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.75***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
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*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.

If we consider only the inflation targeting period, we can use the official measure of unemployment to run the canonical Phillips curve relationship. Table 3 presents these results.

Table 3: Estimated Wage inflation: private sector wage

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<tr>
<td>$u_t$</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.33*</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u_{t-1}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi_{t-1}$</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
The results are consistent with the previous analysis. The relationship between wage inflation and unemployment is significant only when inflation is added to the specification. The insignificance of the third specification is perhaps due to the fact that the correct specification for the unemployment rate is a stationary AR(1) model and not the assumed AR(2). Using this result, we finally substitute the inflation rate with the observed expected inflation of the trade unions as recorded by the BER. Table 4 shows that this specification fits the data much better, highlighting the increasing importance of inflation expectations in the determination of wage inflation under the inflation targeting regime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Estimated Wage Inflation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E\pi_t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u_t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E\pi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2000Q3 - 2013 Q4

*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.

In all cases, the analysis of the residual shows that wage inflation was particularly high just before and during the financial crisis, moderating only after 2010. Overall, the estimation results imply a significant wage rigidity relative to either employment or unemployment conditions, with a certain sensitivity to inflation and inflation expectations. The next step is to conduct a sectoral analysis where we investigate the responsiveness of wages to output prices given the level of labour productivity and the reservation wage.

5 A sectoral analysis of wage responsiveness to employment conditions

Economic theory suggests that there is a positive link between wage and labour productivity. When output per worker rises, this creates an incentive for firms to increase their demand for workers which ultimately results in an increase in workers compensation. This theory is backed up by empirical evidence in countries including Israel (Lavi and Sussman, 2001), Australia (Kumar et al, 2009), the United States (Strauss and Wohar, 2004), as well as South Africa (Fallon, 1992, Fallon and da Silva 1994, Wakeford, 2004, and Klein, 2012). Most of these studies however conclude of a weak link between wage and labour productivity as far as the South African labour market is concerned. The absence of a strong relationship between these two variables has direct implications for firms’ profitability, which in turns may have acute repercussions in terms of job creation, and finally, in terms of unemployment.
This has often been highlighted in the literature as an explanation for the severe job shedding the economy witnessed in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the weak link between wage and labour productivity can be explained by the presence of noises of macroeconomic and/or institutional nature. Klein (2012) for instance argues that the presence of these factors may create a wedge between the two variables which may explain why gains in labour productivity are not fully translated to wage increases. The main factors highlighted in his study include price and wage rigidities, labour adjustment costs, and other structural factors (market regulations, entry restrictions, etc.). Bentolila and Sain-Paul (2003) emphasize on the bargaining power of workers in wage settlements as an important player in weakening the relationship between labour productivity and wage. This paper focuses on the role played by reservation wages.

Very few studies in the South African literature focus on the impact of reservation wages on the functioning of the labour market. Rankin and Roberts (2010) highlight two studies regarding the subject. Although these studies (Kingdon and Knight, 2000, and Nattrass and Walker, 2005), along with the recent work of Levinsohn and Pugatch (2010) focus on the role of reservation wages in explaining youth unemployment. Our study in this section diverges from the available literature in the sense that the focal point here is to investigate the link between reservation wages and labour productivity in explaining the existence of wage rigidities at a sectoral level.

5.1 A simplified model

We begin the lay off of the model following Blanchard and Katz (1999) with a textbook Phillips curve equation of the following form:

\[(w_t - w_{t-1}) = a_w + (p_{t-1} - p_{t-2}) - \beta u_t + \epsilon_t \]  

(17)

where \(p\) and \(w\) are respectively logarithms of the price level and the nominal wage, \(u\) is the unemployment rate, \(a_w\) is a constant and \(\epsilon\) is an error term. We assume as usual that the lagged inflation term given by \((p_{t-1} - p_{t-2})\) is a proxy for expected current inflation which we may also write as \((p_e^t - p_{t-1})\).

After reorganizing equation (17), it takes the following familiar form:

\[(w_t - p_e^t) = a_w + (w_{t-1} - p_{t-1}) - \beta u_t + \epsilon_t \]  

(18)

The empirical wage equation implies that the expected log real wage depends on the lagged log real wage and the unemployment rate. Intuitively, a low unemployment rate leads to an increase in the expected real wage, and vice versa.

However, most theories of the natural rate of unemployment imply in contrast a negative relationship between the level of wages and unemployment if both the reservation wage and the level of productivity
are taken into account. Such a wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994, Blanchard and Katz, 1999) suggests that given the reservation wage, the tighter the labour market, the higher the real wage. Under some simplifying assumptions, models of efficiency wage (Shapiro, 1984) or bargaining (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) deliver a representation of a wage relation of the following form:

\[
(w_t - p_t^e) = \mu b_t + (1 - \mu) y_t - \beta u_t + \epsilon_t
\]  

(19)

where \( b_t \) is the log of reservation wage, \( y_t \) is the log of productivity and \( \mu \) is a parameter ranging from 0 to 1. The above relationship simply means that the expected real wage depends on both the reservation wage - which is basically the wage if unemployed - and on the level of productivity.

A quick look at the wage Phillips curve (18) and the theoretical wage relation nested in (19) reveals two striking differences. First off, the reservation wage and the level of productivity are absent in the wage Phillips curve but present in the wage curve. Second and as stated earlier, the Phillips curve shows the relation between the change in real wage and unemployment whereas the theoretical wage curve is the relation between the level of real wage and unemployment given the reservation wage and the level of productivity. Blanchard and Katz (1999) gives an extensive discussion of the determinants of the reservation wage which will help them establish the conditions under which the wage Phillips curve and the theoretical wage relation can be reconciled.

Given that the reservation wage by definition is the wage an individual receives when unemployed, it therefore depends first of all on the generosity of unemployment benefits and other forms of support the same unemployed individual can expect to receive if jobless. Therefore, it follows that the institutional dependence of unemployment benefits on previous wages suggest that the reservation wage will move with lagged wages. It seems logical then to assume that workers’ aspirations in job search and wage bargaining would very likely be shaped by previous earnings. Further, Blanchard and Katz (1999) argue that the reservation wage depends on the utility of leisure, in other words what an unemployed individual does with his or her time. The utility of leisure may include home production and earning opportunities in the informal sector. Consequently, increases in productivity in the informal market and home production are closely related to those in the formal sector. Finally, the reservation wage depends also on non labour income. Thus, productivity increases lead to equal proportional increases in labour and non labour income.

It therefore seems logical to assume that the reservation wage depends on both productivity and lagged wages. Following Blanchard and Katz (1999) and for the sake of simplicity, we may write:

\[
b_t = a + \lambda (w_{t-1} - p_{t-1}) + (1 - \lambda) y_t
\]  

(20)

where \( a \) is a constant and \( \lambda \) is a parameter lying between 0 and 1. By substituting this expression
for the reservation wage in the wage relation given by (19), we obtain:

\[(w_t - p_t^e) = \mu a + \mu \lambda (w_{t-1} - p_{t-1}) + (1 - \mu \lambda) y_t - \beta u_t + \epsilon_t\]  

(21)

Looking at the above equation, it appears the theoretical wage relation in (21) is consistent with the Phillips curve representation given by (18) if and only if \(\mu \lambda = 1\). In other words, the wage relation and the Phillips curve specifications can be reconciled only if the following two conditions are simultaneously satisfied: (a) there is no direct effect of productivity on wages given the reservation wage (\(\mu = 1\)) and, (b) there is no direct effect of productivity on the reservation wage (\(\lambda = 1\)). The strong performance of a standard wage Phillips curve specification on US data suggests that \(\lambda \mu = 1\) may be a reasonable approximation for the US labour market as suggested by Blanchard and Katz (1999). On the other hand, the authors argue that the same findings do not apply for the European labour market. The striking difference between the empirical wage and unemployment relation in the US and Europe is a well known fact. In the current case however, the presence of an error correction term in the European and its absence in the US wage equation is at the core of the debate. We suspect the same error correction term may be present in the South African wage equation as well. The question for debate is however, what is the magnitude of the South African error correction term relative to the European labour market?

Before indulging into the discussion about the differences between the three economies, lets begin by rewriting (21) into:

\[(w_t- w_{t-1}) = \mu a + (p_t^e - p_{t-1}) - (1 - \mu \lambda)(w_{t-1} - p_{t-1} - y_{t-1}) + (1 - \mu \lambda) \Delta y_t - \beta u_t + \epsilon_t\]  

(22)

Wage inflation depends on expected inflation, the unemployment and an error correction term defined as the difference between the lagged real wage and lagged productivity. An estimation of equation (22) shows that the coefficient on the error correction term for the US labour market is close to zero with point estimates that are wrong signed, small and insignificant. On the other hand, in most European and various OECD countries, the error correction term comes in with a significant and right signed coefficient which is on average around 0.25. Blanchard and Katz (1999) discuss what could possibly explain the difference between European and US labour markets.

Intuitively, the difference between the labour markets lies on the direct effect of productivity on wages (\(1 - \mu = 0\) for the US and \(1 - \mu > 0\) for Europe) and the direct effect of productivity on reservation (\(1 - \lambda = 0\) in the US and \(1 - \lambda > 0\) in Europe). This simply means that firstly, in Europe, unions play a greater role in wage settings. Further, stringent hiring and firing regulations in Europe may cause wage setting to behave differently compared to the US. This therefore provides evidence that productivity has more pronounced and direct effects on wages in Europe than in the US (Abowd et al,
Secondly, the importance of the underground economy for the unemployed in Europe may also be a significant factor to take into account to differentiate the two labour markets.

Given these arguments, prior expectations would suggest that the South African labour market may be similar to the European one given the resemblance in terms of high bargaining power of workers, rigorous market regulations and a sizeable informal sector.

5.2 Empirical Study

5.2.1 Data

We use a panel of nine industrial sectors including: agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, construction, trade, transport, finance, and community, social and personal services. The annual data covers the period 1970 to 2013. Nominal wage is captured by the nominal remuneration per employee by sector. We use output price by sector as a measure of variable price and we rely on 2000 indexed employment data. We take into account both formal and informal measures of employment per sectors. Finally labour productivity is captured by an index of labour productivity per sector.

Before discussing the empirical results, we begin with a quick look at the data.

The correlation between nominal wage and employment appears positive throughout, although the relationship is weak and relatively inconclusive in the case of the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector. We observe a strong positive correlation for the trade and community, social and personal services
sectors. These two sectors are predominantly composed of public sector firms.

5.2.2 Empirical results

We estimate our model using pool mean group estimation techniques which is suitable for non-stationary heterogeneous panels. We investigate the existence of a long run relationship between nominal wages, output price and labour productivity, and the presence of an error correction term in the South African wage equation. Variables in the short run includes nominal wage, output price, labour productivity and employment in both formal and informal sectors. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that in the equation we estimate, the coefficient on unemployment is negative, which suggests an inverse relationship between real wage and unemployment. Since the measure for unemployment is unreliable, we use employment data instead as mentioned in the data description section. This explains for the negative sign on the coefficient estimate for employment in the results. This however should be interpreted as
a positive relationship since the sign on $\beta$ in equation (22) is already negative. The overall results are reported in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$d. \ln nw$</th>
<th>$\ln p$</th>
<th>0.95 ***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln prod$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.97 ***</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$SR$</th>
<th>$ec$</th>
<th>$d. \ln p$</th>
<th>$d. \ln prod$</th>
<th>$d. emp$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.113^{***}$</td>
<td>0.301 ***</td>
<td>0.363 ***</td>
<td>$-0.326^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** denotes significance at the 1% level

Our expectation of the existence of an error correction term in the wage equation for South Africa is confirmed. The coefficient is right signed and significant but is however lower than the findings of Blanchard and Katz (1999) of 0.25 for the European market. This finding therefore has some implications in terms of certain features of the South African labour market, which suggests there are some unobservable variables that may affect wages. Some of these features are similar to those found in the European labour market. In particular, the sizeable bargaining power of trade unions, rigorous market regulations and the considerable size of the informal sector all play a significant role in explaining the existence of the error correction term in the South African wage equation.

In the long run we find the coefficients on price and labour productivity to be very close to 1, which is in line with prior expectations. In the short run on the other hand, these coefficients are quantitatively smaller and remain significant. The coefficient estimates of price, labour productivity and employment are all right signed and significant. However the values we find are also all quantitatively small. This suggests that the weak response of wages to market conditions can therefore also be confirmed at the sectoral level. Intuitively, if increases in wages are not correlated with the rise in labour productivity growth, then a negative shock will inevitably lead to considerable job shedding and a reduction in employment, ultimately translating into a rise in unemployment. Additionally, increases in wages often results into a rise in inflationary pressures, which the monetary authority can only offset by inducing large contractions in demand.

The table below shows the pool mean estimates by industrial sectors.
Table 6: Pool mean group estimates per sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>d.lnww 1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ec</td>
<td>−0.165** (0.061)</td>
<td>−0.231*** (0.038)</td>
<td>−0.143*** (0.061)</td>
<td>−0.166** (0.077)</td>
<td>−0.112* (0.064)</td>
<td>−0.146* (0.077)</td>
<td>0.059* (0.031)</td>
<td>−0.054 (0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.lnp</td>
<td>0.327* (0.172)</td>
<td>−0.076 (0.061)</td>
<td>0.364** (0.171)</td>
<td>0.075 (0.124)</td>
<td>0.352* (0.192)</td>
<td>0.456*** (0.095)</td>
<td>0.345** (0.131)</td>
<td>0.163 (0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.lnprod</td>
<td>0.029 (0.086)</td>
<td>0.149 (0.215)</td>
<td>0.185 (0.146)</td>
<td>0.539** (0.264)</td>
<td>0.152 (0.175)</td>
<td>0.189 (0.138)</td>
<td>0.582** (0.187)</td>
<td>0.502** (0.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.emp</td>
<td>−0.608*** (0.174)</td>
<td>−0.468** (0.157)</td>
<td>−0.391** (0.155)</td>
<td>−0.034 (0.217)</td>
<td>−0.223* (0.126)</td>
<td>−0.431** (0.157)</td>
<td>−0.326* (0.178)</td>
<td>−0.231 (0.153)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. ‘d’ denotes the first difference.


For the first six sectors, the coefficient on the error correction term is right signed and significant. On the other hand, in the last three columns, we report coefficients that are significant but wrong signed (transport), insignificant but right signed (finance) and significant and right signed but very small (community, social and personal services). The mining sector stands out with an error correction term coefficient close to the European market. The coefficient on employment keeps the right sign and is significant throughout except for electricity, construction, and community, social and personal services sectors. It is important to note that this coefficient estimate is relatively close to the value found in the previous section, except for the agriculture sector where wages and employment display a rather strong correlation.

Regarding the response of wages to labour productivity, we find that to be insignificant for sectors including agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, and trade. The coefficient estimates for labour productivity for sectors we find statistically significant are mostly in line with the literature. For instance, Klein (2012) reports an average value of 0.45 for non agricultural sectors. This is an indication that labour productivity does not fully translate into an increase in wages. Therefore as discussed earlier, there are other factors involved that may account for this weak response of wages to increase in labour productivity. The community, social and personal services sector however is a very appealing exception, which confirms prior expectations after the first glance at the data. We argue that this is a sector predominantly skilled workers intensive which may explain why there appears to be a strong link between wages and labour productivity when we take into account the reservation wage.
6 Conclusion

This paper estimates a New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve for the South African labour market. We first begin by estimating a model with staggered nominal wage following Erceg, et al (2000) using aggregate quarterly data from 1970Q1 to 2013Q4. Overall, the results are in line with economic theory but the difference between accounting for the whole sample and focusing on post apartheid era alone appears significant. Typically, we find that wage inflation and employment have a weak relationship, which becomes even weaker with the most recent sample. Further, nominal wage inflation and price inflation have a strong and robust relationship which again becomes quantitatively weaker in the second sample (post apartheid era). These results are confirmed when we use unit labour cost as a measure of wage inflation.

Secondly, we turn to investigate, at a sectoral level, the responsiveness of nominal wage to output price, labour productivity and employment, given the reservation wage. Our findings confirm prior expectations of the presence of an error correction term in the wage equation for the South African labour market; with a significant and right signed coefficient of 0.113. This coefficient is smaller relative to the finding of the European labour market. Nevertheless, the existence of the error correction term in the wage equation confirms that certain features of the labour market contribute to the rigidities of wages. These features include a considerable bargaining power of trade unions, strict hiring and firing regulations and a sizeable informal sector. It is important to highlight that despite these rather interesting findings, a better understanding of the determinants of reservation wages for South Africa may be required. Most of the studies in the available literature focus mainly on the impact of the reservation wage on explaining youth unemployment, rather than assessing its contribution to the weak response of wages to labour market conditions.

Overall, for the first section, the results reveal a decent evaluation of the South African labour market at an aggregate level despite the crucial lack of data we face in this investigation. This forces us for instance to use employment data instead of the ideal choice that would have been unemployment. Nonetheless, we draw conclusions that are mostly in line with available South African literature; i.e. wages are not very responsive to labour market conditions which suggest that there exists other factors that prevent a better response. This raises questions in terms of the conduct of monetary policy given the current environment. Furthermore, in the second section, the curious case of the community, social and personal services (which is dominated by public sector firms) sparked interrogations given the strong responses of labour productivity and prices to wages. A priori, we suspect that an explanation of such results is perhaps because of the fact that the sector is mainly skilled workers intensive. Given the scarcity of skilled workers in the South African labour market, this may have implications on private sector firms decisions.
References


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